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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST-IMPORT RESTRICTIONS-IMPORT BAN ORDERED AS
EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
MUST NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST FOREIGN PRODUCERS OR REDUCE
CoMPErrTIoN

In September 1969 Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VW), a wholly
owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation' and an automobile importer, acquired as a wholly owned subsidiary an independent

manufacturer of automobile air conditioners3 and reorganized it as
Volkswagen Products, Inc. (VW Products). VW Products rapidly
became the primary supplier of air conditioning equipment to

Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. (VW Pacific), an independently owned
distributor of Volkswagens and other automobiles,' and preempted
the market position of Calnetics Corporation (Calnetics), another
independent supplier.5 In September 1970 Calnetics instituted an
action against VW, VW Products, and VW Pacific, claiming that

the acquisition operated as an illegal vertical restraint on trade in
1. Volkswagen Werk A.G., a German corporation, which manufactures Volkswagen autombiles.
2. VW is a New Jersey corporation which imports Volkswagen, Audi, and
Porsche automobiles into the United States for sale through distributorships set
up regionally throughout the United States. Porsche motor cars are manufactured
by Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche KG, a German corporation.
3. Delanair Engineering Co., Inc., engaged in manufacturing air conditioning
units for foreign automobiles, was a Texas corporation and a subsidiary of
Delaney-Galley, a British company.
4. VW Pacific, a California corporation, also distributed Porsche and Audi

automobiles in a sales region comprising Southern California, Southern Nevada,
Arizona, and Hawaii. In 1973, VW Pacific abandoned its franchise, and VW now
sells directly to dealers in VW Pacific's former franchise area.
5. Calnetics is a California corporation that manufactures and sells automobile air conditioners, sheet metal products, tool and part machinery, and plastic
products. Calnetics supplied VW Pacific through Meier-Line, Inc., its division
and wholly owned subsidiary. Although added as an additional plaintiff in Calnetics's complaint in the instant case, for convenience the court attributes all the
actions of Meier-Line, Inc., to Calnetics throughout the opinion. Calnetics Corp.
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 678, n. 1 (1976).
6. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970),
respectively prohibit monopolization in restraint of trade and provide for criminal
sanctions. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides: "No corporation engaged in
commerce shall acquire . . . the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where. . . the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
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violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of
the Clayton Act.6 VW and VW Products counterclaimed. 7 In separate proceedings on Calnetics's section 7 claim,8 the United States

District Court for the Central District of California first ruled on
the damages issue and other claims9 and then considered further
evidence on Calnetics's claim for equitable relief. 1 In June 1972
the court held that VW's acquisition of VW Products violated section 7 and asked the parties to present plans for relief." In January
1973 the court ordered VW's divestiture of VW Products, enjoined
VW and its wholly owned subsidiaries for a seven year period from
importing into the United States Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche
automobiles with factory-installed air conditioning, and restricted
VW's options in procuring air conditioning equipment in the
United States." The parties affected by the import ban (and the
government of the Federal Republic of Germany through a memorandum to the State Department) had protested that the import
restrictions would violate provisions of the German-American
Treaty of 195411 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
7. VW and VW Products alleged that Calnetics entered into a secret agreement in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In 1968, Calnetics
allegedly had agreed with VW Pacific's service manager to pay the latter 3% of
gross proceeds from any sales of air conditioners to VW Pacific as compensation
for sales to VW Pacific that he induced. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 623, 625 (C.D. Calif. 1972).
8. During pre-trial proceedings, the court ordered the section 7 claims to be
tried separately from, and prior to, the Sherman Act claims.
9. On February 28, 1972, the court granted VW Pacific's motion for summary
judgment on all claims against it and granted Calnetics's motion for summary
judgment on the Sherman Act counterclaims against it. After the conclusion of
Calnetics's case before a jury, the court directed a verdict in favor of VW and VW
Products on the issue of damages.
10. 532 F.2d 674, 680 (1976).
11. 348 F. Supp. 606 (1972). The court later granted summary judgment in

favor of VW and VW Products on Calnetics's Sherman Act claims. 348 F. Supp.
623 (1972).
12. To restrict VW's ability to provide for its air conditioning needs outside
of the restored market, the court also ordered a ten year ban on VW's domestic
production of air conditioning equipment and prohibited VW from purchasing
more than 50% of its equipment needs from the divested company. In addition,
VW and VW Products were ordered to pay Calnetics's attorney fees and court
costs. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (9th Cir.
1973); see 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203 (1973).
13. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. Article
XVI(1) provides: "Products of either Party shall be accorded, within the territo-
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(GATT)14 prohibiting actions that discriminate against German
trade. 5 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, held, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for jury trial proceedings. Because the dispositions and
findings of the lower court are inadequate, and because the import
ban discriminates against foreign automobile manufacturers, the
need for imposing import restrictions must be reexamined in light
of their anticompetitive effects on domestic sales by foreign manufacturers and United States treaty obligations. Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 355 (1976).
The primary objective of antitrust laws is to preserve the free
enterprise system by guaranteeing strong competition as a rule of
ries of the other Party, national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in
all matters affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use."
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5)
and (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, Article I amended by Protocol
Modifying Part H and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade of Oct. 30, 1947, signed, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 Stat. 3679, T.I.A.S. No. 1890,
62 U.N.T.S. 80, provides, in pertinent part:
Article I-GENERAL MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT
1. With respect to the customs duties and charges of any kind imposed
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect
to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article I,
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties ...
Article III-NATIONAL TREATMENT ON INTERNAL TAXATION
AND REGULATION ....
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
15. The text of the German government's memorandum to the State Department may be found at Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 353 F.
Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Calif. 1973).
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trade.'" Consequently, section 7 of the Clayton Act seeks to elimi-

nate vertical restraint of trade occurring through any acquisition
of corporate assets that forms a combination between a producer
and a supplier.' 7 Section 7 is violated when it is likely that compe-

tition may be foreclosed in a substantial share of a market that is
itself substantial.'" Proof of a section 7 violation requires a showing
of an acquisition's anticompetitive effects in a market proven to
be within "any line of commerce in any section of the country." 9
Private parties may seek relief under section 7, but certain factors

limit success in private suits. Although the Clayton Act possibly
provides for damages for private parties" and certainly provides
injunctive relief,2 ' no court has awarded damages in a private section 7 suit, 2 and all are reluctant to employ their full equitable
power for private litigants. To win injunctive relief, a private party
must prove with a fair degree of certainty actual injury and show
a causal connection between the antitrust violation and the in16. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
17. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
18. 353 U.S. at 595.
19. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). A market is defined through the
application of the "relevant product market test," whereby the outer boundaries
of a broad market are determined by the interchangeability of use or the crosselasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. Identifiable
submarkets may exist within the broad market. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 295, 325-26 (1962). The role of cross-elasticity of supply or "production flexibility" in section 7 enforcement remains unsettled. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 68 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]. Anticompetitive effects can
be expected to occur when an acquisition tends to bar entry into either the
supplier's or producer's market or to disadvantage existing firms in the market.
W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND ANTITRUST LAWS 340 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as FUGATE].
20. In addition to the instant decision several courts have suggested that
treble-damage actions are possible under section 7. See Gottesman v. General

Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1969), on remand, 310 F. Supp. 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
Although there is a split of authority in federal courts, the Supreme Court has
not ruled on the question. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 289, n.238.
21. The Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
"any person . . .shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any
court of the United States. . .against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws. . .

."

Courts recognize that their injunctive power in anti-

trust cases is derived from statute and not from their power to do equity.
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 292.
22. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 288.
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jury.23 Because private interests do not necessarily parallel public
interests, equitable relief fashioned in antitrust actions must be
conditioned on public need. 24 Consequently, when great public injury has been revealed through private antitrust actions, courts
have not been reluctant to grant drastic relief.2 Section 7 applies
to foreign commerce when both the acquired and the acquiring
corporation are engaged in commerce "among the several States
and with foreign nations. ' ' 2 Thus it has been held, in United States
v. Aluminum, Ltd.,2 that section 7 applies to the acquisition of a
domestic corporation by a foreign firm. In that case, the government alleged that a Canadian aluminum producer's acquisition of
a domestic aluminum fabricating firm through the Canadian
firm's United States subsidiary violated section 7; the consent decree provided for the sale of the acquired facilities .28 Although

foreign commerce is not immune to antitrust laws, foreign trade
policies may operate to modify antitrust judgments. In United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 29 domestic and foreign companies were found to have conspired in a cartel arrangement, and
divestiture was affirmed as an appropriate remedy for the restoration of competition. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, however, proffered the first suggestion from the Supreme Court that injunctive
relief could be modified given the "special circumstances" of foreign trade. 31 Since that decision, some courts have modified equitable relief in the interest of foreign trade. For example, in United
States v. GeneralElectric Co.,3" appropriate relief was modified to
23. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
24. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 131 (1969).
To demonstrate the demands of public need, an injunctive order must be accompanied by specific findings of fact as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniels Distillery, 454 F.2d
442, 453 (9th Cir. 1972).
25. Schrader v. National Screen Service Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,217 at
71,008 (E.D.Pa. 1955); Fanchon and Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
1953 Trade Cas. 67,452 at 68,281 (2d Cir. 1973).
26. Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). The Supreme Court has suggested
that if an acquisition has a substantial impact on United States commerce, the
jurisdictional clause of the Clayton Act will be liberally interpreted. United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (dicta); FUGATE 335.
27. 268 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1966), 1967 Trade Cas. 171,895 (consent decree).

28. Id.
29. 341 U.S. 593 (1951), modifying and aff'g, 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio
1949).
30. 341 U.S. at 605.

31. 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
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exclude a Dutch corporation from a portion of the decree that had
provoked a protest from the Dutch government and that may have
conflicted with local law.2 In United States v. The Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,3 the court found that an
international cartel had unreasonably restricted United States
imports and exports. In response to objections by the Swiss government and at the instance at the State Department, the Justice
Department held unprecedented negotiations with the Swiss government and the defendants so that the final judgment might be
amended.34 The court modified the original order and declared that
implementation of the illegal restrictive agreement was no longer
possible, that Switzerland had instituted precautions against the
violation's recurrence, and that a modification of the final order
would be advantageous to United States foreign policy. 5 However,

given the courts' awareness of foreign trade complications, provisions of an antitrust order will be fashioned to fit the needs of the
case with the intent of devising the most effective remedy possi-

ble."6 Consequently, courts have not hesitated to enjoin domestic
corporations from performing contracts with foreign parties, even
to the extent of halting imports and exports. 3 7 In addition to affect-

ing the type of relief available in antitrust cases, the demands of
foreign commerce have given rise to certain exceptions to the application of antitrust laws. United States antitrust laws do not
reach business practices undertaken by a sovereign nation," corporate acts mandated by foreign governments,"9 and business ar32. The Netherlands has refused to comply with United States antitrust laws
and has declined to incorporate the restrictive business practices clause in bilateral agreements with the United States. Haight, The Restrictive Business Practices Clause in U.S. Treaties: An Antitrust Tranquilizerfor InternationalTrade,
70 YALE L.J. 240, 243-44 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Haight].
33. 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 at 80,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modifying, Civil No.
96-170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
34. FUGATE 444-45.
35.

See note 33 supra.

36. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 334 (1945); Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972).
37. United States v. United Engineering and Foundry Co., 1952-1953 Trade
Cas. 67,378 at 67,973 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395
U.S. 100 (1969).
38. "A state is immune from the exercise by another state of jurisdiction to
enforce rules of law" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 65
(1965). Courts will tend to construct sovereign immunity narrowly and will defer

to State Department policy, which also declines to apply the doctrine expansively. FUGATE 111-14.
39. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). However,
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rangements specifically exempted by statute." The last exemption
may include exceptions provided by treaties, which are construed
in pari materia with congressional acts." Usually, treaty rights
offer no protection against antitrust enforcement.4" In addition,
most United States treaties with friendly foreign nations include
a "restrictive business practices" clause granting sovereign parties
full power to invoke antitrust legislation. In dealing with antitrust
violations, courts generally must analyze the exigencies of foreign
commerce in view of the statutory requirements for a competitive
trade system and attempt to satisfy the needs of both.
In the instant decision, the court declared that the district

court's summary dispositions of the damages claims were erroneous, thereby requiring a new trial on all claims and a suspension
of all equitable relief granted. In reviewing the summary dispositions of the district court, the court noted that the movant's bur-

den of proof is heavier in antitrust cases. This policy stems from
the recognition of the inherent difficulty of proving an antitrust
violation.44 In reviewing the dispositions that determined whether
VW Pacific was involved in the alleged conspiracy,45 whether the
mere authorization by a foreign government to engage in restrictive trade practices is inadequate as a defense. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962).
40. The primary statutory exemption to the United States antitrust laws is
the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970). See FUGATE
223-54.
41. U.S. COwsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
353 F. Supp. 1219, 1224 (C.D. Calif. 1973).
42. See, United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F.Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
In an action charging an importer and a United States subsidiary of a Japanese
corporation with conspiracy to restrain importation, the defendants moved to
dismiss the action citing the United States-Japanese treaty. The court held that
a domestic corporation had no standing to invoke treaty provisions for an exclusive remedy for antitrust violations.
43. See, Haight 242; FUGATE 375-76.
44. 532 F.2d at 683-84:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot ...

It is only when the witnesses are present and

subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be

given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute
for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of "even handed
justice." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962).
45. In addition to finding sufficient evidence for jury consideration of this
issue, the court held that VW Pacific's argument that it had participated involun-
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acquisition of VW Products was a result of an independent business judgment or conspiratorial intent, and whether Calnetics sustained calculable damages as a result of the alleged conspiracy, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence to try those issues
before a jury and reversed the summary dispositions." In rejecting
the summary procedures taken by the district court, the instant
court ordered jury proceedings on Calnetics' section 7 claims.
Since VW, VW Products, and VW Pacific had a right to a jury trial
on the remanded issues stemming from Calnetics's original demand for a jury trial," and since the district court had held that
the original defendants had violated section 7 and had ordered
injunctive relief, the instant court found that the decision granting
equitable relief must be vacated in order to preserve a fair jury trial

for all parties." Although the instant court vacated the order for
equitable relief, observing that it therefore need not consider the
merits of the challenges to that order, the court commented "in the
interest of judicial economy" on the equitable relief granted should
the district court proceed to reconsider the injunctive remedies. 0
The court observed that in fashioning equitable relief the district
court failed to consider the cross-elasticity' of production facilities
or capacity in defining the product market and erred in failing to
analyze the anticompetitive effect of the acquisition. The court
then declared that divestiture is not available as relief to private
parties in antitrust cases. 2 Since the other measures of equitable
tarily in the conspiracy was not a valid defense. 532 F.2d at 682.
46. The court also held that VW's counterclaim against Calnetics alleging
commercial bribery in violation of the Sherman Act was insufficient and warranted a summary judgment in favor of Calnetics. The court further held that
because VW Products could allege damages flowing from the secret agreement
arranged by Calnetics, the summary judgment against VW Products' counterclaim should be reversed and the claims remanded for trial. 532 F.2d at 686-88.
47. The court also reversed the summary judgment in favor of VW and VW
Products on Calnetics' Sherman Act claims, holding that Calnetics' sales resulting from its illegal agreement with VW Pacific were admissible for proving damages. 532 F.2d at 688.
48. See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAMcTcE 38.39 1, at 312; 38.45 (2d ed. 1948,
as amended 1975).
49. The court stated that the right to a jury trial must not be infringed by a
determination of equitable claims prior to the legal claims joined in the action.
Otherwise, the prior determination of equitable claims could trigger a collateral
estoppel or resjudicataeffect on the claims for damages. 532 F.2d at 690. See Ross
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537 (1970).
50. 532 F.2d at 691.
51.

See note 19 supra.

52, The Ninth Circuit declared that divestiture was unavailable as a remedy
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relief 3 were designed to supplement the order to divest, the court
found them inappropriate as future remedies. In evaluating the
import ban on foreign automobiles distributed by VW and
equipped with factory-installed air conditioning, the court criticized the remedy in terms of its anticompetitive effects, its impact
on foreign relations, and its bearing on corporations not party to
the action. Because the import ban was premised on a limited
market concept, the court declared that the ban had an anticom-

petitive effect on the sale of automobiles by closing the market to
foreign manufacturers of automobiles with factory-installed air
conditioners. Additionally, because the import restrictions dealt
primarily with competition within the submarket of domestic automobile air conditioning equipment, the court found that the ban
had a short-term anticompetitive effect on the automobile air conditioning trade by barring foreign manufacturers as market entrants and thus eliminating consequential downward price pressure. The court stated that such anticompetitive effects must be
considered when fashioning injunctive relief. The instant court
further discovered that the import ban was discriminatory because
it imposed restrictions on German automobile manufacturers that
were not applicable to the domestic automobile industry. But the
court agreed with the district court's declaration that the restrictive business practice clauses of the German-American Treaty of
1954 and GATT permitted United States courts to enforce sanctions against foreign violators of antitrust laws. However, since the
treaties were relevant to the determination to impose an import
in private antitrust suits in International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v.
General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1975). The
unavailability of divestiture to private parties under § 16 of the Clayton Act is
an issue before the United States Supreme Court. NBO Industries Treadway
Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick, Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,479 at 67,116 (3d
Cir. 1975) petitionfor cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1975) (75-770).

53. Because divestiture is unavailable to Calnetics as a remedy, the proper
measure of the need for relief is the threat of prospective injury to Calnetics. 532
F.2d at 692. Since the ten year ban on the domestic manufacture of automobile

air conditioners was designed to supplement divestiture, the court found that it
is not a preferable form of relief. 532 F.2d at 694. The court declared that the
purchase restriction enjoining VW from satisfying more than 50% of its air conditioning equipment needs from trade with the divested firm should not be imposed
since it stifles competition and creates a regulated industry. Id. In addition to
these advisory holdings, the court reversed the district court's decision awarding

attorney's fees and trial costs to Calnetics and preventing VW Pacific from counterclaiming against Calnetics on alleged damages stemming from the secret

agreement. 532 F.2d at 694-96.
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ban through both the restrictive business practices and trade discrimination clauses, the court declared that a proper evaluation of
the necessity for an import ban requires a justification of the ban
under the germaine treaty clauses. Since the import ban on VW
barred its importation of Porsche automobiles, the court stated
that basic fairness demands that future proceedings on the ban
provide Porsche, an independent German corporation, the opportunity to be heard. The court urged that any reconsideration of
imposing an import ban on VW should specifically investigate the
applicability of relevant treaties, the unavailability of divestiture
as a remedy, and the anticompetitive effect of the ban on the sale
of automobiles and of automobile air conditioning equipment.
In its evaluation of the import ban, the instant court was foresighted in establishing clear guidelines for reassessing the restrictions. Its opinion provides an excellent insight on how courts will
determine equitable relief when a section 7 violation affects foreign
commerce. The court suggests that restoring competition in the
market has greater value than providing relief for the alleged injury to Calnetics or preserving foreign trade relations. However, in
recommending that the district court reevaluate the treaty implications of the import ban, the court confirmed the view that trade
policy considerations can have a vital role in determining proper
relief when foreign commerce is affected." The court's sensitivity
to foreign commerce is apparent in its recommendation that the
relevant market and the anticompetitive repercussions of relief be
viewed on an international level and that other foreign producers
be afforded an opportunity to be heard when their interests are at
stake. Should the district court adhere to the guidelines set by the
instant court when it reconsiders the import restrictions as relief,
the result will most likely be in accord with antitrust objectives
and the interests of foreign trade. In keeping with the instant
court's suggestion that import restrictions are extreme antitrust
remedies, the district court would do well to exhaust all alternative
remedies before shaping relief with adverse effects on automobile
imports. Yet while the instant decision reaffirms the unavailability
of divestiture to private plaintiffs, the court paradoxically does not

disavow the use of import bans to restore competition in a monopolized market. Consequently, the instant decision illustrates the
element of uncertainty in foreign trade stemming from the interaction of international business operations and judicial enforcement
54.

FUGATE

416-18.
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of'antitrust laws. Indicating official sensitivity to the potential
conflict between antitrust enforcement and international trade
policy, cooperative arrangements for dealing with restrictive business practices have been promulgated by the Justice Department,5 5 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),'5 and the contracting parties of GATT. International consultation between governments on antitrust cases has
alleviated otherwise counter-productive tension. 8 In a move to formalize exchanges of information on antitrust litigation, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are ratifying an
executive agreement for mutual cooperation in this field. 9 Not-

withstanding these developments, the Justice Department's decision to prosecute under section 7 remains a process of weighing the
possibility of an anticompetitive effect against the substantiality
55. In view of problems of comity with foreign nations and of national security, the United States Justice Department consults with the State Department,
the Defense Department, and other relevant agencies on potential actions which
would affect relations with other governments. Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 97 (1955). In 1962 the Justice
Department organized the Foreign Commerce section of the Antitrust Division to
coordinate cases and investigations involving foreign trade and to communicate
with appropriate agencies, particularly with the Office of Business Protection of
the State Department, the Commerce Department, and the Federal Trade Commission. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 379.
56. The Restrictive Business Practices Committee is the primary organ of the
OECD devoted to achieving international antitrust cooperation. In 1967 the
Council of the OECD adopted the Committee's resolution calling for mutual
notification of national legislation governing restrictive business practices, coordination in enforcing current laws, and exchanges of information, where legally and
politically practical, on anticompetitive and monopolistic practices. FUGATE 463.
57. In 1961 the Contracting Parties of GATT adopted a resolution drafted by
a group of experts recommending that consultation on restrictive business practices be promoted. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 526 (1969).
58. See, United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,
Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), judgment modified, 1965 Trade
Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
U.S.A. 372 (2d ed. 1970); Haight 240 et seq.
59. At this writing, formal implementation is delayed pending ratification of
the Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business
Practices by the German Bundestag. The accord calls for the two governments
to share information on antitrust litigation and developments that "have a substantial effect on. . . international trade. . .. " BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 772 at A-2, D-1 (July 13, 1976). The accord is similar to an oral agreement between the United States and Canada yet no further bilateral accords are
immediately foreseen, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 771 at A-9 (July
6,1976).
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of the violation." Hence, the unpredictability of government enforcement and severe penalties set by antitrust laws combine to
deter corporations from engaging in international ventures that
may be legal and beneficial." This restraining effect on commerce
is even more evident given the impact of private antitrust suits.2
Businesses and sovereignties involved in international trade are
equally exposed to the pitfalls of a private antitrust action but do
not have the benefit of consultation or other arrangements designed to ease friction in the wake of government cases. Despite the
instant court's helpful guidelines, which recommend that equitable relief in antitrust cases be based on a realistic market definition
and a comprehensive appraisal of the foreign trade implications,
the possibility of harsh injunctive remedies in private actions will
continue to inhibit international commercial growth.
John J. Curry, Jr.
60.

Compare Rosenthal, Imports on Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 60 CORNELL

L. REV. 600 (1975) with Graham & Hermann, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
Mergers Involving Foreign Interests, 23 STAN. L. REV. 205, 234 (1971).
61.

J. BEHRMAN,

CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS ON THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE:

POTENTIAL FOR RESOLUTION 14 (1974).

62. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association has discussed the
punitive effects of the "private attorney general" concept in private antitrust
cases as well as limited opportunities for influencing decisions for equitable relief
in such cases. 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 180-82 (1974).

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-REsTRICTIvE TRADE PRACTICES
-PATENT
LICENSING AGREEMENTS THAT RESTRICT COMPETITION
BETWEEN MEMBER STATES WITHOUT IMPROVING PRODUCTION OR
DISTRIBUTION OR PROMOTING TECHNICAL OR ECONOMIC PROGRESS
VIOLATE ARTICLE 85

In 1951, Beyrard, a French inventor, licensed the Association des
Ouvriers en Instruments de Precision (AOIP), a Paris manufacturer, to exploit his patents' in the production and sale of variable
resistor electrical devices. 2 The licensee, AOIP, was given monopoly selling and manufacturing rights in France, but was prohibited

from exporting to any country where the licensor had granted another license or had assigned the patent rights to a third party. The
parties agreed to refrain from competing against one another in all
the fields covered by the agreement. AO1P also promised to refrain
from challenging the validity of the patents. Royalty payments:,
extended for the twenty-year life of the 1951 patents. The development of any subsequent improvement patent automatically extended the payments until the expiration of the new patent. Under
a separate clause AOIP agreed to make extended royalty payments
even if it relied solely upon its own research and development or
that of a third party in designing and marketing the improved
electrical devices. Plaintiff, AOIP, ceased royalty payments in
1971 and sued for an interlocutory order establishing that the
1951 agreement was anti-competitive and prohibited by article 85
(1) of the Treaty of Rome.' Defendant Beyrard maintained that the
Community rules on competition should not apply when the agreement is concluded between two parties in a single Member State.
Defendant argued that the royalty payments should continue until
the expiration of the most recent patent improvement in 1989. The
lower court dismissed AOIP's application on the ground that AOIiP
had impliedly recognized the validity of the 1969 improvement
1. Of eleven patents granted, only Patent No. 1,088,565, dated August 7, 1951,
and entitled "Liquid resistor electrical device" has actually been exploited by
AOIP.

2.

AOIP held an estimated 6.98% share of the French market for electrical

devices and accounted for 17.93% of French exports to other EEC Countries.
3.

Payments were calculated by reference to the licensee's net turnover in

respect of any equipment which contained any of the electrical devices.

4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), March
25, 1957. The authoritative English text of the treaty may be found in TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN CoMMuNIIs (Office of Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1973). An unofficial English text may be found in 298

U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
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patent when it obtained Beyrard's agreement to the assignment of
half of the rights attaching to patents in other countries which were
derived from the French patent of 1969. 5 The Paris Court of Appeal
upheld the order. The Commission of European Communities,
held, reversed.6 When a patent licensing agreement unduly restricts competition by forbidding other licenses, prohibiting exports, denying patent revocation action by the licensee, permitting
indefinite licensing extension, disallowing competition between

the parties, and requiring the licensee to pay royalties on its own
research efforts, the agreement violates article 85(1) and is null
and void under article 85(2) unless the agreement as a whole im-

proves the production or distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress. Association des Ouvriers en Instruments
de Prkcision/BeyrardDecision [1976] J.O. L6/8, 2 CCH COMM.
9801, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D14 (1976).
MKT. REP.
Article 85(1)7 prohibits and renders unenforceable' agreements
which are liable to affect trade between the Member States and
which are designed9 to or result in the prevention, restriction or
5. Decided by interlocutory order of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris,
on October 19, 1971.
6. Under article 3 of the Treaty of Rome a firm which violates article 85(1)
may be ordered to end the infringement through a decision of the Commmission.
Articles 11-14 and Council Regulation No. 17/62 grant the Commission broad
powers of investigation in its enforcement of the antitrust provisions.
7. Article 85(1) provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to

commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
8. Article 85(2) provides: "2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant
to this article shall be automatically void."
9. The prohibited agreement need not actually affect trade between Member
States if the purpose of the agreement is to prevent, restrict or distort competition. Establissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, 12
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distortion of competition within the Common Market. Under article 85(1) an agreement must be examined in both its legal and
economic context"0 to determine whether it is capable of affecting
trade between the Member States by partitioning the market in

certain products between the states." Unlawful agreements
under article 85(1) may, however, obtain antitrust exemption
under article 85(3).12 The exemption pertains to situations in which

the beneficial aspects of the agreement predominate over the
harmful effects engendered by the restraint on competition.,3 In
Davidson Rubber Company4 the Commission held that a noRecueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour (Cour de Justice de la Communaut6
Europ'enne) 429 [hereinafter cited as Recueil], 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8046,
at 7652, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 473 (1966).
10. S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, 13 Recueil 525, 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8053, at 7804, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 40 (1967). The Court
of Justice of the EEC has defined the economic considerations as including the
nature and quantity of the products dealt with in the agreement, the position of
each of the contracting parties in the relevant market and the importance of that
position, the isolated nature of the agreement in question or, alternatively, the
position of the agreement within a group of agreements and any possibilities for
competition in the same products left open by means of re-exportation or parallel
importation. Socibt6 Technique Mini6re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 12 Recueil 337, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047, at 7696, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 375, 376
(1966). That the economic and legal effects of the agreement are the decisive
factors in deciding whether the agreement is prohibited by articles 85(1) has been
called the "market effect criterion." B. CAWTHRA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE EEC 39, 40 (1973). See also, Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition in the
Member States of the European Economic Community, 7 INT'L LAW 855, 864
(1973).
11. Socibt6 Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 12 Recueil 337,
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047, at 7696, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 375 (1966).
12. Article 85(3) provides:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:

-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertaking concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
13. Etablissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, 12
Recueil 429, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8046, at 7655, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 478
(1966).
14. Davidson Rubber Company Decision, [1972] Official Journal of the Euro-
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challenge clause fell within the prohibition of article 85(1) as a

restriction on the competitive capacity of the licensees, and did not
qualify for a dispensatory declaration under article 85(3).1" Export
prohibition clauses have likewise met with disfavor,'6 although
they should not be regarded as prohibited per se.'7 The validity

of an export prohibition clause may in part depend on whether
there is a parallel patent in the prohibited territory.'" Exclusive
licensing agreements' 9 were seemingly exempted from the scope
pean Communities L143/31 [hereinafter cited as J.O.], CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9512, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52 (1972).
15. At the request of the Commission the parties deleted this clause subsequent to notification. Likewise in the Burroughs AG and Geha-Werke GmbH
Decision the parties to the agreement deleted a no-challenge clause upon the
Commission's request. [1972] J.O. L13/53, CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9486, 11
Comm. Mkt. L.R. D72 (1972). In the Raymond-Nagoya and Company Decision,
however, the Commission permitted a no-challenge clause because it would not
affect competition in the Common Market and its removal would only have
improved the position of competitors in the Far East. [19721 J.O. L143/39, CCH
9153, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45 (1972).
COMM. MKT. REP.
16. Etablissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, 12
Recueil 519, 520, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8046, at 7653, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
473 (1966).
17. As far back as 1962, the Court of Justice stated that "since the context in
which the export prohibition clause appears is not known to the court, it is unable
to decide whether this clause comes within the provisions of article 85(1)." De
Geus v. Robert Bosch et al., 8 Recueil 109, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8003, at
7139, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 29 (1962).
18. Patent licensing agreements can give rise to three types of territorial restrictions. First, the licensee may be prohibited from selling directly into a market
outside his territory where there is a parallel patent which is being exploited or
second, where there is a parallel patent which has not been exploited or third,
where there is no parallel patent. Cawthra has suggested that the first type is
clearly permissible while the third is impermissible. The second might be permissible if the licensor was delaying exploitation as part of his marketing plan. If,
however, the delay was deliberate in order to keep out competitors then it might
be impermissible. Cawthra, Licensing Patents, 124 NEw L.J. 116, 117 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Cawthra]. It should also be noted that the territorial restriction should apply only to the licensee and not to his customers. The exclusive

right granted to the licensee should be a right of first sale: the licensor should not
be able to prohibit the customers of the licensee from selling outside his territory.
This principle is known as "the doctrine of the exhaustion of property rights."
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft bmH v. Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH, 17
Recueil 487, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8106, at 7192, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 657,
658 (1971). By paragraph 67 of the FirstReport on Competition Policy the Commission has made it clear that it regards the Deutsche Grammophon holding as
equally valid for patents. Cawthra, at 116.
19. The Notice exempts non-restricted exclusive licensing agreements in
which the licensor undertakes not to authorize any other person to utilize the
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of article 85(1) by the Commission's Official Notice on Patent
Licensing Agreements." The Commission felt that such exclusive
agreements were unlikely to affect trade between the Member
States.2 In Davidson Rubber Company the Commission retreated
from this broad stance and held that an exclusivity clause was not

excluded from the scope of the prohibition of article 85(1),22 although it did qualify for exemption under article 85(3). 23Davidson

thus appears to state that exclusive manufacturing licenses are
acceptable while exclusive selling licenses are not.24 The Commission has upheld improvements clauses when the obligation is
nonexclusive and each licensee retains the right to license third

parties. 25 The Court of Justice of the EEC has held that noninvention himself. Wertheimer, Licensing Agreements underEEC Antitrust Law,
in COMMERCIAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE E.E.C. 123 (W. Gerven and F.
Lukoff eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Wertheimer].
20. [19621 J.O. 139/2922, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2698. The Notice states
in part that:
"The following clauses appearing in patent licensing agreements do not fall
under the prohibition laid down by article 85, paragraph 1, of the Treaty:
A. Obligations imposed on the licensee, the purpose of which is:
1. The limitation of the methods of exploitation of the invention provided for in the patent rights (manufacture, use, distribution) to certain
persons."
21. Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 123. The Commission also felt that the
licensor's undertaking not to utilize the patented invention himself so closely
approaches an assignment of rights that it should not be objectionable.
22. [19721 J.O. L143/31, CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9512, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
D52 (1972). Accord, Burroughs AG and Geha-Werke GmbH Decision, [1972]
J.O. L13/53, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9486, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D72 (1972).
23. In Davidson the Commission felt that the restriction on competition
caused by the exclusivity clause was sufficiently mitigated by a clause permitting
the free sale of the licensed products throughout the Common Market to fit within
the exemption of article 85(3). [1972] J.O. L143/31, CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
9512, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52 (1972). Likewise, a clause in a patent licensing
agreement whereby the licensor grants the licensee exclusive manufacturing
rights within a specified portion of the Common Market may qualify for article
85(3) exemption. Kabelmetal-Luchaire Decision, [1975] J.O. L222/34, CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 9761, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D40 (1975). This is particularly
the case when the exclusivity provides a stimulus for the licensee to penetrate a
territorial, or product, market which has not yet been exploited by the licensor.
Bronbemaling/Heidemaatschappij Decision, [1975] J.O: L249/27, CCH COMM.
MKT. REP.

9776, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D67 (1975).

24. Cawthra, supra note 18, at 116. Alternatively the Davidsondecision seems
to be authority for the proposition that an exclusive manufacturing license is
acceptable provided it is accompanied by a non-exclusive selling license. Cawthra
has suggested this distinction may be incorrect both in theory and in practice.
25. Raymond-Nagoya Decision, [1972] J.O. L143/39, CCH CoMM. MKT. REP.
9513, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45 (1972). The Commission required Raymond to
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competition clauses violate article 85(1).20 The validity of extension clauses in patent licensing agreements had not been considered before the instant decision.27
The Commission found that Beyrard and AOIP were undertakings within the meaning of article 85.2 The patent licensing agree-

ment was also held to be an agreement within the meaning of
article 85.29 Due to AOIP's sizable exports of electrical devices to
other Common Market countries the Commission held that the
agreement affected trade between the Member States."0 Trade was
also found to be affected because AOIP's exclusive rights in France
prevented other firms (both foreign and French) from entering the
French market.31 Before addressing the relevancy of article 85(1)
the Commission decided that the licensor could not invoke the
Official Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements to defend the
agreement." The Commission then decided that when taken together the six clauses constituted an infringement on competition
and the agreement was therefore prohibited by article 85(1). The
Commission found that the exclusivity clause individually restricted competition because the licensor gave up for the duration
of the agreement the power to grant licenses to other firms for the
alter its improvements clause in the original agreement; in the reworded version
Nagoya was obliged to grant Raymond only a non-exclusive license concerning
the improvements. 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45. For a discussion of the Commission's actions regarding patents see Note, Protectionof IndustrialProperty Rights
in the EEC, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 708 (1975).

26. The Court of Justice has also suggested that non-competition clauses
between the parties to an agreement and third parties may violate article 85(1)
because the parties could through such an agreement, by preventing or restricting
the competition of third parties in a product, attempt to create or guarantee for
themselves an unjustified advantage to the detriment of consumers and users.
Italy v. EEC Council and EEC Commission, 12 Recueil 563, 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP.
8048, at 7719 (1966).
27. This may be due to the fact that the Commission and Court of Justice
have considered relatively few patent licensing agreement cases.
28. [19761 J.O. L6/12, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
Mkt. L.R. D22 (1976).

29. Id.
30. [1976] J.0. L6/13-14, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.

9801, at 9796, 17 Comm.

9801, at 9798, 17 Comm.

Mkt. L.R. D25 (1976).
31. Id.
32. The Commission held that the licensor could not invoke the Notice to
defeat the validity of the licensing agreement because the latter contained restrictions (particularly the no-challenge, non-competition, extension and improvements clauses) which are not regarded by the Notice as compatible with article
85(1). [1976] J.O. L6/13, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9801, at 9798, 17 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. D22.
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same territory.3 The export prohibition clause was found to restrict competition because it protected one licensee against the
competition of another licensee or assignee.3 4 The no-challenge
clause was held to be anti-competitive because it deprived the
licensee of the possibility of cancelling its obligation through an
action for patent revocation.35 The extension clause which permitted the licensor to unilaterally and indefinitely extend the duration
of the agreement was adjudged to restrict competition because it
obliged the licensee to pay royalties on unexpired or unused patents and thus burdened manufacturing costs without any
economic justification." The noncompetition clause also was held
to constitute a restriction on competition.3 7 The improvements

clause obligating the licensee to pay royalties on its own research
and development was found to restrict competition because payments would be required even if the improvements patents were
not exploited."s The improvements clause was also deemed to be
anti-competitive because it discouraged the licensee from engaging
in its own research and development. 9 The Commission held that
the no-challenge, extension, noncompetition and improvements
clauses did not qualify for exemption under article 85(3) because
they did not improve production or distribution, or promote technical or economic progress.4" The Commission did not pass on
the possible exemption of the exclusivity and export prohibition
clauses under article 85(3).41 Instead, it held that when all six
clauses are combined in a single patent licensing agreement the
latter is prohibited under article 85(1) and is not exempted by
article 85(3) because the net effect of the agreement is to unduly
restrict competition and hinder both technical and economic prog33.

Id.

34. [1976] J.O. L6/12, 2 CCH COMM.
Mkt. L.R. D22, 23.

REP.

9801, at 9797, 17 Comm.

35.

Id.

36.

[1976] J.O. L6/13, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.

9801, at 9797, 17 Comm.

MKT.

Mkt. L.R. D23.
37. [1976] J.O. L6/13, 2 CCH COMM.
Mkt. L.R. D24.
38.

MKT. REP.

9801, at 9798, 17 Comm.

Id.

39. Id.
40. [1976] J.O. L6/14, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9801, at 9799, 17 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. D26. The non-competition clause also removed the commercial incentive for the two parties to conduct research in fields parallel to those of the
licensed patents, while the improvements clause reduced the incentive to find
better technical solutions which were not covered by the licensor's patents.
41.

Id.
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ress without any improvement in the production or distribution of
goods.4"
The decision has broad significance since it marks the first time
the Commission has struck down a patent licensing agreement in
its entirety as violative of article 85(1). By voiding the entire agreement the Commission leaves open the issue of whether a patent
licensing agreement containing only some of the six clauses would
be upheld.43 The Commission will clearly be reluctant to grant
article 85(3) exemption to agreements containing no-challenge,
noncompetition, extension and improvements clauses.44 However,
agreements containing only exclusivity and export prohibition
clauses may well be permitted.4 5 The decision reaffirms the

proposition that the Official Notice on Patent Licensing
Agreements no longer exempts exclusivity clauses from the scope
of article 85(1).6 By holding the Notice inapplicable the Cornmission suggests that it may be reluctant to declare any similar block
exemptions in the foreseeable future.4" The Commission will seemingly emphasize the flexibility of article 85(3) in differentiating
between permissible and impermissible patent licensing agreements." An ad hoc approach founded on an economic analysis
42. Id.
43. The agreement may be severed and any offending portions removed. If the
remaining portion constitutes an operative agreement it will be upheld by the
Commission. Davidson Rubber Company Decision, [19721 J.O. L143/31, CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
9512, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52 (1972).
44. However, since article 85(1) is based on an economic evaluation of the
effects of an agreement, it should not be interpreted as setting up any prejudgment whatever with regard to a specific category of agreements identifiable from
its legal nature. Socit6 Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 12
Recueil 337, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047, at 7695, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 374
(1966).
45. See, e.g., Davidson Rubber Company Decision, [1972] J.O. L143/31,
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9519, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52 (1972).
46. According to Wertheimer, the inference seems warranted that the position
of the Commission with regard to exclusive sales licensing agreements has undergone a change since December 1962. Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 124. Cawthra
goes so far as to state that the Notice has no legal significance and no longer fully
represents the thinking of the Commission on patent licensing agreements. Cawthra, supra note 18, at 117.
47. Instead the Commission will probably continue to publish new decisions
on individual license agreements notified to it. See Cawthra, supra note 18, at

117.
48. See Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 139. Wertheimer suggests that the
Commission can use this flexibility to eliminate and dispose of those cases which
it considers as unimportant, the so called "de minimis cases."
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probably permits the greatest realization of the EEC's fundamental goal, the integration of nine national communities into a single
free Community economy. 49 Such flexibility, however, can only be
achieved at the expense of business enterprises, patent holders,
and inventors who must now regard present and future patent
licensing agreements with caution.
Dan T. Carter
49. Deutsche Grammophon Gesselschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossm~rkte,
17 Recueil 487, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8106, at 7192, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
657 (1971).

IMMIGRATION-A

STATE MAY PROHIBIT THE EMPLOYMENT OF

ILLEGAL ALIENS

Petitioners, immigrant migrant farm workers,' brought suit in
California Superior Court pursuant to California Labor Code §
2805(c) 2 against respondent farm labor contractors3 for damages4

and a permanent injunction5 against respondents' willful employment of aliens not entitled to lawful residence in the United States
in violation of section 2805(a).6 The complaint alleged that respon1. The individual plaintiffs were Leonor Alberti De Canas, Miguel Canas, and
others. De Canas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
2. The complete text of CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976) reads as
follows:
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers.
(b) A person found guilty of a violation of subdivision (a) is punishable
by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five
hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.

(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action against the
employer based upon violation of subdivision (a).
3. Defendants were Anthony G. Bica, Juan Silva, and others.
4. In the California courts, plaintiffs claimed damages due to defendants'
tortious interference with their right to pursue a livelihood. 40 Cal. App. 3d 976,
978. The United States Supreme Court opinion does not mention a claim for
damages, but states that the petitioners sought reinstatement. De Canas v. Bica,
96 S. Ct. 933, 935 (1976).
5. Plaintiffs asserted that the violation of § 2805 constituted an act of unfair
competition which could be enjoined pursuant to CAL. CivL CODE § 3369 (West
1970) which provides in part:
(1) Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a penalty . . . except in a case of nuisance or unfair competition. (2) Any person performing. . . an act of unfair competition within this state may be
enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. (3) As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice ....
6. On its face, § 2805 conflicts with federal law by prohibiting the employment
of aliens who, although not entitled to lawful residence in the United States, are
entitled to work in the United States under pertinent federal laws. The term
"alien entitled to lawful residence in the United States" is defined in California
Administrative Code, Title 8, part 1, ch.8, art. 1, § 16209 (1972), as "any noncitizen of the United States who is in possession of a Form 1-151, Alien Registration Receipt Card, or any other document issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service which authorizes him to work." The complete
regulation is quoted in full in Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d
673, 677, n.3, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435, 436, n.3 (1974). This regulation also sets standards both for employer inquiry into applicants' immigration status and for violation of § 2805. In deciding De Canas, neither California court cited this regulation,
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dents had refused petitioners continued employment due to a surplus of labor as a result of respondents' knowing employment of
illegal aliens. Both sides agreed that the constitutionality of section 2805 is controlling of the issues presented. 7 The trial court
sustained respondents' demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal,8 holding section 2805 unconstitutional as encroaching upon and interferring with Congress' comprehensive scheme enacted pursuant to its exclusive power over
immigration.' The Court of Appeals affirmed."0 The California
Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari" and held, reversed and remanded. A state statute which prohibits an employer from knowingly employing an
alien who is not permitted to work in the United States under
pertinent federal laws and regulations, if such employment would
have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers, is not unconstitutional either as a regulation of immigration or because it is
preempted under the supremacy clause of the Constitution by the
Immigration and Nationality Act." De Canas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933
(1976).
The authority to formulate immigration policy is a federal
power, 13 which has been recognized as exclusive by the United
which was issued for the purpose of giving limited construction to the term "alien
entitled to lawful residence in the United States," and to the other provisions of
§ 2805. For clarity, this paper uses the term "illegal alien," rather than "alien
who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States," to mean an alien
not entitled to work in the United States by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service or any other federal authority.
7. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 978.
8. Superior Court of Santa Barbara Co., No. SM 11789, Marion A. Smith,
Judge.
9. The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
[hereinafter cited as INA].
10. California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, De Canas v. Bica,
40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). This court took the additional view
that congressional failure to add sanctions on employers to its control mechanisms within the INA was intentional, and, therefore, the California statute,
either in its provision for criminal penalities or in its application in providing a
basis for injunctive relief or damages, is in conflict with the national law and
policy.
11. 422 U.S. 1040 (1975).
12. The Supreme Court left the construction of § 2805 for the California court
on remand. Inits opinion, the Court, inreferring to "illegal aliens," assumed
"that the prohibition of § 2805(a) only applies to aliens who would not be permitted to work in the United States under pertinent federal laws and regulations."
96 S.Ct. at 935, n.2.
13. "The Congress shall have Power to ... regulate Commerce with foreign
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States Supreme Court. 4 A state may not infringe upon Congress'
delegated power to determine, by regulating or controlling immigration,'" who should or should not be admitted into the United
States or the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.
However, there is a narrow, recognized area of authority in which
a state may "make such regulations regarding the immigration of
aliens as are reasonably necessary to promote the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of those within its jurisdiction."'" State laws
affecting aliens may also be invalidated on a second constitutional
ground-preemption under the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. 7 A state may not interfere with the immigration scheme devised by Congress,'" now contained in the ImmigraNations, and ...
CONST.

[T]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization .

"

U.S.

art. I, § 8.

The Power of Congress to control immigration stems from the sovereign
authority of the United States as a nation and from the constitutional power
of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations ....

It has been

settled by repeated decision, that Congress has the power to exclude any
and all aliens from the United States, to prescribe the terms and conditions
on which they may come in or on which they remain after having been
admitted, to establish the regulations for deporting such aliens as have
entered in violation of law, .

.

. and to commit the enforcing of such laws

and regulations to executive officers.
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2:1653-54 (82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952).
14. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) (state tax on all

aliens, to be paid by steamship companies which brought them in held unconstitutional).
15. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (California statute requiring
shipowner to give bond for certain classes of foreigners landing in California
"invades the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and is
therefore void.")
16. 3 AM. JuR. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 51 (1962). Compagnie Francaise de
Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1901) (state
statute authorizing board of health to prohibit any healthy person including an
alien from coming into an area of the state infected with any contagious disease
held valid); State v. Brandhorst, 156 Mo. 457, 56 S.W. 1094 (1900) (state judgment naturalizing minor not subject to collateral attack).
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
18. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state's denial of welfare benefits to aliens interfered with the federal immigration process); Teitscheid v.
Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299 (D. Vt. 1972) (state depriving alien of the right to work
places a burden on aliens which Congress did not anticipate, thereby interfering
with the exclusive right of federal government to regulate immigration and natu-
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0 an early
tion and Nationality Act of 1952.19 Hines v. Davidowitz,"
authoritative case providing a test to determine whether state law
conflicts with federal law so as to be preempted, stated the issue
to be: "Whether, under the circumstances of [the] particular case
[the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 2 ' In Hines, the Court ruled unconstitutional the Pennsylvania alien registration acts as preempted by the
Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940. After closely scrutinizing
the federal legislative history, the Court reasoned that Congress
intended to create one uniform national registration system for
aliens within the United States and to foreclose state action in this
field. 2 A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,2" when it held that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act was preempted by federal anti-subversive legislation
which, taken as a whole, evinced the intention of Congress to occupy the field. In both Hines and Nelson, the Court emphasized
the national importance and the pervasiveness of the federal
schemes in the specific fields that the states were attempting to
regulate. 4 Recent cases have highlighted two crucial factors for
determining whether state legislation is preempted by federal supervision: (1) a clear manifestation of congressional intention to
oust the exercise of state power; 5 and (2) actual conflict in the
operation of the regulations." In New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino, the Court refused to declare the state law

preempted without substantial evidence of congressional preemptive design, and stated that preemption is not to be inferred merely
ralization). Both of these opinions also invalidated the state statutes on equal
protection grounds.
19. INA, § 101.
20. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
21. 312 U.S. at 67.
22. Id. at 74.
23. 350 U.S. 497 (1955).
24. 350 U.S. at 502; 312 U.S. at 66.
25. New York Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)
(state authority, to require individuals to accept employment as a condition for
receiving federally funded aid to families with dependent children, not preempted
by the Social Security Act).
26. "The test of whether both federal and state regulation may operate, or the
state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed
at similar or different objectives." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
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from the comprehensive character of the federal legislation. "7 In
FloridaLime & Avocado Growers v. Paul,the Court cited the test
laid out in Hines8 and held that federal marketing orders setting
a maturity test for Florida avocados did not displace a California
statute setting a different test for avocados entering that state. In
FloridaLime, the Court laid out the principle that: "federal regulation

. . .

should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory

power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature
of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that
Congress has unmistakably so ordained."

9

The opinions of both

Florida Lime and Dublino focused attention on state authority
over and interest in, respectively, the readying of foodstuffs for
market and the allocation of aid to families with dependent children, and declared the state objectives to be meritorious and the
subject matter suitable for local regulation." Congress has not enacted immigration laws controlling the employment of illegal aliens, 3' although a bill has been introduced in Congress to provide
a penalty for knowingly hiring an alien not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence unless the employment of such alien is au32
thorized by the Attorney General.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that California
Labor Code § 2805 represents a valid exercise of the state police
power. The Court affirmed the exclusivity of federal power over
.immigration, but found an absence of congressional action on the
subject of the employment of illegal aliens. The Court ruled that
California's regulation of employment by imposing sanctions on
state employers who hire illegal aliens, even if there is some purely
27.

413 U.S. at 415.

28. 373 U.S. at 141.
29. 373 U.S. at 142.
30. 413 U.S. at 413; 373 U.S. at 144-46.
31. A proviso to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 states that "employment (including the usual
and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute
harboring [of illegal aliens]," which is a felony under the INA. In another area
of legislation, Congress has criminalized the knowing employment of illegal aliens
by farm labor contractors. 7 U.S.C. § 2041 et seq.
32. H.R. 982, to amend 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), is the initial legislation. In House
Report 94-506, to accompany H.R. 8713, the clean version of the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary recommends passage of this bill which would establish a
three step procedure for imposing sanctions on employers who hire illegal aliens.
The report outlines the serious adverse impact that the employment of illegal
aliens has on United States labor and economy. H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
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speculative and indirect impact on immigration," is not constitutionally proscribed. Regarding the issue of preemption, the Court
employed the test adopted in FloridaLime,34 and concluded that
persuasive reasons did not exist which foreclosed California's regulatory power over the employment of illegal aliens. The bulk of
Justice Brennan's opinion clarified the decision on the preemption

issue. The Court emphasized that a state has broad authority to
protect its workers from unemployment, depressed wage scales,
and working conditions.3 5 Accordingly, the Court extended this
authority to the prohibition of knowing employment of illegal aliens." The Court found that section 2805 of the California Labor
Code deals with a legitimate state interest in a way which is consistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act and other pertinent
federal laws. The Court ruled that the Immigration and Nationality Act was not intended to oust state regulation of the employment of illegal aliens. Employment of illegal aliens was not considered by the Court to be an integral part of the federal regulation
of immigration, but merely a peripheral concern of the Immigration and Nationality Act not warranting preemption of the state's
police power. The Court's decision was further based on persuasive
evidence of congressional intent to allow states to regulate the
employment of illegal aliens in a manner consistent with the federal scheme. In reversing the California Court of Appeals' decision, the Court concluded that Congress had not completely barred
state authority to regulate the employment of illegal aliens. Because construction of section 2805 was properly left for the California court to decide on remand, the Court did not determine
whether section 2805 was unconstitutional because it conflicts with
or burdens federal law concerning immigration. 9
33. 96 S. Ct. at 936.
34. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
35. The Court referred to traditional state authority to control the employment relationship and the state's interest in fair employment practices. Further,
the Court recognized that extensive local employment of illegal aliens has various
harmful effects on local employment. 96 S. Ct. at 937.
36. This applies when an "illegal alien" is defined according to note 6 supra.
37. This is based on the finding of no "specific indication in either the word-

ing or the legislative history of the INA that Congress intended to preclude even
harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of
illegal aliens in particular." 96 S. Ct. at 937-38.
38. This evidence consists of a provision in 7 U.S.C. § 2041, § 2051, which
sanctions appropriate state laws consistent with § 2044(b) and § 2045, which
regulate the employment of illegal aliens by farm labor contractors.
39. This issue is the second crucial factor in deciding preemption cases (out-
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By disregarding infirmities in the California law that would
lead to a finding of preemption on remand, the De Canas Court
strongly suggests that section 2805 is constitutional. 0 Undoubtedly, section 2805 could have been easily invalidated. 4' The Court
relied principally on Florida Lime's ruling requiring an explicit
demonstration that the state's police power is preempted by exclusive federal authority4 2 to give those states whose economies
are suffering from the employment practice of hiring illegal aliens43
a mandate to enact appropriate legislation. Congress has recognized state frustration caused by the inability of the Immigration
and Nationalization Service to keep illegal aliens out of the

United States, and by its own failure to include in the Immigration and Nationality Act criminal sanctions against employers of
illegal aliens. 44 At the same time, political and administrative

considerations have hampered the enactment of effective federal
legislation. 5 A recent law review article details a strong appeal
lined in paragraph 2 above). The Court closed with the observation that, on its
face, § 2805(a) (by prohibiting "the employment of aliens who, although not
entitled to lawful residence in the United States, may under federal law be permitted to work here." 96 S. Ct. at 940) unconstitutionally conflicts with federal
law. A remedial construction is given by the California Administrative Regulations. See note 6 supra. Other possible interferences with federal supervision of
immigration are outlined by the Court. See 96 S. Ct. at 938, n.6 (possible burden
imposed on legally employable aliens by § 2805).
40. Assuming the statute is construed in light of the Administrative Regulations. See note 6 supra.
41. The proviso to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (see note 31 supra) could have been read
as immunizing the employment of illegal aliens, or the existence of pending
'litigation could have been viewed as congressional intent to occupy the field (see
note 32 supra). Nevertheless, the Court drew the inference that Congress presently believes that the problem created by employment of illegal aliens does not
require uniform national rules and is appropriately addressed by the states as a
local matters. 96 S. Ct. at 939, n. 9.
42. 373 U.S. at 142.
43. The number of illegal aliens in the United States was estimated in 1975
to be between 4 to 12 million. American employers exploit this source of labor
because illegal aliens, "by virtue of their precarious status must work harder,
longer, and often for less pay." H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
The problem of illegal alien employment is particularly acute in the Southwest
because 99% of the illegal entries made into the United States in 1975 were across
the Mexican border. 1975 IMM. & NAT. SER. ANN. REP. 13.
44. H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
45. These considerations are brought out fully in the Hearings. Hearings on
H.R. 982 Before a Subcomm. on Immigration,Citizenship and InternationalLaw
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Contested
issues surrounding H.R. 982 and related bills (see note 32 supra) include the
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for state regulation of the employment of illegal aliens by proposing a new draft of California Labor Code § 2805."1 The author
4
argues that section 2805, if amended as he suggests,"
would
assist, not conflict with, existing federal statutes. Clearly, state
legislation such as section 2805 complements the Immigration and
Nationality Act and related federal law." The Court's decision in
the instant case meets a definite need with a rational alternative.
States may regulate the employment of illegal aliens according to
local requirements until such time as Congress decides to act in
this area."
Melissa Gallivan
extent of jurisdiction to be given the Attorney General under the proposed law,

whether amnesty should be granted to illegal aliens who have been in the United
States over a certain number of years, and the extent of the burden which will
be placed on employers by the new law.
46. Note, State Regulation of the Employment of Illegal Aliens: A Constitutional Approach, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 565 (1973). The article was prompted by the
holding in Dolores Canning Co. v. H6ward, supra note 6, declaring § 2805 unconstitutional as preempted by federal law and void for vagueness.
47. This proposed act prohibits the employment of aliens "not entitled to
work in the United States," specifically defines this term, and provides for the
establishment of rules and regulations in furtherance of § 2805.
48. Through its penalty provisions, which removes the economic incentive for
employers to hire illegal aliens, § 2805 reduces the work opportunity which attracts illegal aliens to the United States.
49. Under the holdings of Hines and Nelson, if Congress enacted sanctions for
the knowing employment of illegal aliens, the California and similar statutes
would be preempted.

JURISDICTION-CONTINENTAL SHELF-ABANDONED VESSEL
SALVAGED FROM THE SURFACE OF THE UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL
SHELF BEYOND TERRITORIAL WATERS Is NOT UNDER JURISDICTION OF
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Treasure Salvors, Inc. (Salvors), a Florida corporation, brought
an action' for possession and confirmation of title to an abandoned
vessel 2 it had salvaged 3 from the surface of the Continental Shelf4
outside territorial waters. Salvors' claim relied on principles of
admirality law, which place sole ownership of abandoned vessels
in their salvager. The United States intervened to claim title6
through sovereign prerogative, an English common law principle
placing sole ownership of abandoned vessels recovered by its citizens in the sovereign. The government argued in the alternative
that even if United States common law has not adopted the princi1. Armada Research Corporation appeared with Treasure Salvors as coplaintiff.
2. This vessel is believed to be the Nuestra deAtocha, which sank in or about
the year 1622, while en route from the Spanish Indies to Spain.
3. According to Salvors' brief for the appeal of this case to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, it has spent six years searching for the wreck site and five years
and $2 million recovering a number of objects thought to have been aboard the
Atocha, see note 2 supra. In addition, four people participating in the salvage lost
their lives. Much of the ship and its cargo remain on the ocean floor.
4. Geographically, "Continental Shelf' refers to a gentle slope that extends
from the continents seaward to a point where the submerged land descends much
more steeply towards the ocean floor. It is estimated that Continental Shelves
account for 9.7 million square statute miles. Finlay & McKnight, Law of the Sea:
Its Impact on the InternationalEnergy Crisis, 6 LAW & POLICY ININT'L Bus. 639,
652 (1974).

5. The wreck site is centered approximately ten nautical miles west of the
Marquesas Keys.
6. Wreck site, see note 5 supra, was until recently claimed to be within Florida's jurisdiction. According to a statement in the intervenor's appellate brief to
the Fifth Circuit that was uncontroverted by the plaintiff's appellate briefs, plaintiffs had entered into a contract with the State of Florida to recover objects from
the Atocha wreck site under which their work had been supervised by state agents
for five years. The contract called for a division of the find, 75% to Salvors and
25% to the State. However, on March 17, 1975, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the findings of its special master in United States v. Florida,concluding
that the submerged lands on the Continental Shelf, which include the Atocha
wreck, were beyond Florida jurisdiction. United States v. Florida, No. 52 Orig.
(S.C. March 17, 1975). Consequently, Salvors filed this action to establish its
sole right to the Atocha, her tackle, apparel, cargo, and armament. On September
11, 1975, the Justice Department intervened as defendant in response to requests
by the State of Florida and the Department of the Interior.
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ple of sovereign prerogative, Congress specifically asserted this
prerogative through the Antiquities Act,7 which authorizes certain
cabinet members to issue permits to persons examining ruins and
excavations on government lands, and the Abandoned Properties
Act,' which grants power over abandoned property to the Administrator of General Services? In addition, the government contended
that the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act declared jurisdiction,
control, and power of disposition ' ° over the subsoil and seabed of
the Outer Continental Shelf" bringing the shipwreck site and Salvors' actions there under United States jurisdiction and, consequently, under the specific provisions of the Antiquities Act. Sal-2
vors argued that the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf'
7. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1906). Under the Antiquities Act, the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture and the Navy may issue permits for "the examination of ruins,
the excavation of archaeological sites, and the gathering of objects of antiquity
upon the lands under their respective jurisdictions .
8. 16 U.S.C. § 310 (1965). In part, this act reads:
The Administrator of General Services is authorized to make such . . .

provisions as he may deem for the interest of the Government, for the
preparation, sale, or collection of any property, or proceeds thereof, which
may have been wrecked, abandoned, or become derelict, being within the
jurisdiction of the United States, and which ought to come to the United
States ....
9. The government also asserted that procedures set up by the federal government for protection of antiquities enacted sovereign prerogative. Among those
procedures were permits issued under the Antiquities Act, particularly those
issued to the states of Florida and North Carolina permitting them to search for
the remains of historical vessels on the Outer Continental Shelf; the Historic Sites
Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 462 (1935), authorizing the Secretary of Interior to
preserve important historic properties; and Executive Order 11593, in which President Nixon commanded executive agencies to initiate measures for the preservation of archaeologically significant objects.
10. Congressional declaration of policy, jurisdiction, and construction for the
Outer Continental Shelf Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953) provides:
(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and
are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided
in this subchapter.
(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such a manner that the character as high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the
right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.
11. "Outer Continental Shelf" generally refers to the area of the Continental
Shelf seaward of territorial waters. For definitions of "Continental Shelf" see note
4 supra and note 48 infra.
12. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (effective June 10, 1964). Relevant portions of the
treaty read as follows:
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excluded abandoned ships on the seabed of the Continental Shelf
from assertions of national sovereignty. On Salvors' motion for
summary judgment, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, held, for plaintiff Salvors for the following reasons: an abandoned vessel salvaged from the surface of
the Continental Shelf outside United States territorial waters by
a United States citizen belongs to the salvager, since neither the
common law nor legislation established sovereign prerogative over
abandoned vessels; the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act applies
only to minerals in and under the Outer Continental Shelf; and the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf nullifies assertions of
national jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf, except as
to those exploiting natural resources. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 762151 (5th Cir. 1976).
In 1275 the Statute of Westminster 3 and an act" passed in 1324
firmly established English sovereign prerogative' 5 over wrecks,'"
Article 2
1. The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
Article 3
The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not affect the
legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace

above those waters.
Article 5
1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its
natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation, fishing, or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor
result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication.
13.

Statute of Westminister, 3 Edw. 1, c.4 (1275), which reads:

"...

where a

man, a Dog, or a Cat escape quick out of the Ship, that such Ship nor Barge, ...
shall be adjudged Wreck: (2) but the Goods shall be saved and kept by View of
the Sherriff, . . . so that if any sue for those Goods, and after prove that they
were his ....
within a Year and a Day, they shall be restored to him without

Delay; and if not, they shall remain to the King, .. ."
14. 17 Edw. 2, c.11 (1324) [hereinafter cited as Statute of 1324]. This act
proclaims that: ".

.

. the King shall have Wreck of the Sea throughout the

Realm, (2) Whales and great Sturgeons taken in the Sea or elsewhere within the
Realm, (3) except in certain Places provided by the King."
15. Under common law prior to the Statutes of Westminster and 1324, wrecks,
see note 16 supra, belonged to the King even if the true owner survived. These
later laws allowed the true owner to recover his property. 1 T. CooLEY,
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although some authorities believe it had already been accepted by
the common law." A later case extended sovereign prerogative to
flotsam, jetsam, and ligan,' 8 and the court in In Re The Aquila'9

in 1798 applied sovereign prerogative to anything found derelict at
sea. This prerogative probably developed as a revenue measure
and as an effort to prevent mistreatment of shipwrecked voyagers
2
and property by placing them under the protection of the crown. 1
Reaffirmed by later cases2 ' and statutes, 22 sovereign prerogative
has survived in England.23 Viewing these English statutes on sovereign prerogative as affirmations of the common law, some recent
United States decisions24 adopted sovereign prerogative as part of
290 (2d ed. 1878).
16. A wreck under English common law was goods, cargo and the like thrown
upon the shore from a ship lost at sea. Id., 292.
17. Fee, Abandoned Property: Title to Treasures in Florida's Territorial
Waters, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 360, 361 (1969).
18. The Constables Case, a trespass action by the heirs of a grantee of sovereign rights on his manor and fee to recover wreck and flotsam wrongfully taken
by another extended the King's prerogative to flotsam (property still awash at
sea), jetsam (sunken goods thrown overboard to save ship) and ligan (sunken
goods tied to buoy or cork in order to facilitate recovery). 77 Eng. Rep. 218, 223
(K.B. 1601).
19. In re The Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798) (Swedish ship and cargo
found derelict at sea: if owner did not claim, ownership to pass to sovereign, not
salvager).
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES

20.

See 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 15 at 290; supra note 17 at 99.

21. The King v. Forty-nine Casks of Brandy, 166 Eng. Rep. 414 (Adm. 1836)
(holder of a grant of lordship of manor, including a grant of the shore, awarded
the nine of forty-nine kegs of brandy that touched the shore; the rest passed to

the sovereign as derelict of the seas); The King v.Property Derelict, 166 Eng. Rep.
136 (Adm. 1836) (gold coins and watches taken from a vessel found derelict at
sea passed to sovereign).
22. Merchants Shipping Act of United Kingdom, 57 458 Vict., c.60, § 525
(1894).

23. R.

COLINVAUX, CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY THE SEA 58

(9th ed. 1952).

24. Platboro Limited, Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp.
356 (S.D. Texas 1973) (court held that common law adopted by Texas and United
States included sovereign prerogative over Spanish galleon sunk by hurricane in
Texas territorial waters); Gardner v. Ninety-Nine Gold Coins, 111 F. 552 (D.
Mass. 1899) (ownership of personal belongings of Atlantic shipwreck victim
awarded to public administrator, instead of salvager because decedent's estate
could locate property easier if held by government than if by private party); North
Carolina v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1968) (relying on State v. Massachusetts, infra, the
court found sovereign prerogative a part of English common law, and, consequently, North Carolina common law; the court therefore enjoined salvage operation on Confederate blockade runners sunk in North Carolina coastal waters);
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the English common law transferred to the United States. Some
earlier cases had refused to adopt the prerogative stating, for a
variety of reasons, 8 that sovereign prerogative was not properly
part of United States common law. The earlier cases most often
followed the lead of the court in Russell v. Forty Bales of Cotton, 7
which held that a specific statutory provision was necessary to
enact sovereign prerogative and found that there was no such statute. The court in United States v. Tyndale3 subsequently broadened this requirement, finding that either a statute or settled govFlorida v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (1956) (court decided that Florida's
adoption of English common law included sovereign prerogative and enjoined
salvage operation on old destroyer sunk in Gulf of Mexico in Florida territorial
waters) supra notes 13, 14.
25. United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1902) (money found on body
floating on the high seas awarded to finders despite federal claim of sovereign
prerogative); In Re Moneys in Registry, 170 F. 470 (E.D. Pa. 1909) (relying on
prior authority, especially Russell v. Forty Bales, infra, court awarded to salvager
the twenty bales of cotton he had picked out of the ocean about thirty miles from
Key West); Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F. 503 (E.D. Mich. 1889) (court found that
Illinois did not own a load of coal sunk with schooner in Lake Michigan because
English common law did not specifically apply to abandoned property on the
bottom of a sea and because no state statute authorized Illinois' claim); Russell
v. Forty Bales of Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 42 (No. 12,154) (where forty bales of cotton
found derelict on the high seas, federal government denied remainder after salvage award to finders); Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926) (unsuccessful attempt by United States Navy to assert sovereign prerogative over German freighter sunk in Mississippi River and abandoned).
26. These reasons include: (1) the severe English rule awarding wrecks to the
sovereign despite claims of the original owner did not become part of American
common law, see note 15 supra; (2) the common law of the American colonies was
adopted by the United States, and this body of law did not include sovereign
prerogative; (3) English sovereign prerogative did not evolve until after the Declaration of Independence and, therefore, was not a part of United States common
law; (4) at common law the Statute of Westminster only applied to wrecks, see
note 16 supra, and not to derelict property at sea. Lipska, Abandoned Property

at Sea: Who Owns the Salvage "Finds", 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 97, 103 (1970).
27.

21 F. Cas. 42 (No. 12,154) (S.D. Fla. 1872). The exact wording of the

Russell requirement was "positive enactment or regulation." 21 F. Cas. at 50.
28. 116 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1902). Tyndale required an enactment by Congress
or a settled government practice, since, according to the court, in England this
prerogative had been ordered by the King as a royal revenue. Courts cannot, by
themselves, declare such a royal prerogative. Tyndale's rationale further distinguished United States common law from English common law by pointing to a
statute in the Massachusetts colony altering English sovereign prerogative as
proof that North American colonial policy differed from the severe aspects of
English common law, and that, therefore, English law on sovereign prerogative
did not transfer to the United States. See note 15 supra.
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ernment practice could establish sovereign prerogative. Later, in
Thompson v. United States, the court cited Tyndale in rejecting
sovereign prerogative, while stating that only a United States statute could enact sovereign prerogative over abandoned property.29
Some legislation, such as the Abandoned Properties Act of 1870,
which was a response to the problem of Civil War debris cluttering
battlefields and harbors, did deal with abandoned property.?° The
Act gave the Secretary of the Treasury power to make provisions

for the care of any interests of the Confederate States of America
still held by individuals or local governments in addition to abandoned property within United States jurisdiction that "ought to
come to the United States."31 The leading and perhaps only interpretation of the Act, Russell v. Forty Bales of Cotton, considered
post-war conditions and the Act's specific references to Confederate interests in limiting application of the phrase "ought to come
to the United States" to abandoned property that originally belonged to the United States Government or the Confederacy, or
was engaged in violating the Union blockade. 32 A 1965 amendment,
not judicially interpreted until the instant case, removed specific
mention of the Confederate States and placed the Administrator
of General Services instead of the Secretary of the Treasury in
charge of abandoned property that "ought to come to the United
States. '33 Another statute concerning ownerless property, the Antiquities Act of 1906, 31 gave the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture,
and the Army the authority to issue permits to those seeking to
examine ruins and excavations on lands under their jurisdictions
and provided punishment for appropriating such antiquities from
35
land owned and controlled by the United States without a permit.
Reacting to concern over destruction of historic relics, particularly
American Indian relics of the West, 3 the Act also directed that
29. 62 Ct. Cl. 516, 524 (1926). Thompson held that "Congress could undoubtedly provide that the proceeds of derelicts and abandoned vessels in the navigable
waters of the United States be paid into the treasury; but no such law has been

passed, and until it is the principles of natural law ("finders keepers") must
prevail."
30. No. 75, 16 Stat. 380.

31. Id.
32. 21 F. Cas. 42 (No. 12,154) (S.D. Fla. 1872).
33. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1965).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1906).

35. In its trial brief, the government maintained that the words "owned
and controlled" demanded an interpretation of the scope of the Antiquities Act
expansive enough to include submerged land.
36. 40 CONG. REc. 7888 (1906). Floor debate in the House before passage of
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permits be issued to recognized scientific or educational institutions that would increase knowledge of these antiquities and public
access to them.37 Lack of judicial interpretation of the Act's phrase

"owned and controlled by the United States," however, leaves its

scope largely undetermined. The scope of Congress' 1953 declaration of policy on the Outer Continental Shelf,31 which put the
subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf under United
States jurisdiction, power and control, also remains uncertain. On
September 28, 1945, President Truman foreshadowed Congress'
concern over the Outer Continental Shelf by proclaiming the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed as appertaining to the
United States. 9 Legislative history shows that Congress, like President Truman, was motivated by concern for the national economy
and defense, particularly fearing the paralysis of resource development caused by litigation between states and the federal government over control of the resources of the seabed. 41 Indeed, a congressional declaration of policy accompanied the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, a bill consisting almost exclusively of specific
measures to exploit the natural resources of the Continental
Shelf.4 ' This policy declaration provides that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act be construed so as not to affect the character
of the high seas above the Outer Continental Shelf or the fishing
and navigation of these waters. 42 On the other hand, language of
the declaration and the rest of the Shelf Lands Act does not specifically restrict United States jurisdiction to natural resources in the
Outer Continental Shelf, as did the Truman Proclamation. The
Senate's Report on the Shelf Lands Bill stated that it carried the
the Antiquities Act emphasized the bill's effect on relics and cave dwellings of
the American West.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1906).

38. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953).
39. Truman Proclamation of Sept. 28, 1945, No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303, 59
Stat. 884. The President proclaimed that "the Government of the United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States appertaining to the United States. . ....
40. U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1386 (1953). The
House Report stated that "the strategic importance of oil to our economy and our
defense efforts demand immediate action to alleviate a growing menance to national welfare." It continued, "The interminable litigation over these areas involving State and Federal Government as well as individual applicants has added
nothing but confusion and controversy. . ....
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1443 (1953).
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953).
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Truman Proclamation's limited control "a necessary step forward
and extend[ed] the jurisdiction and control of the United States
to the seabed and subsoil themselves. 4' 3 Before passage of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Tidelands Cases between
states and the federal government had held that federal rights to
natural resources in the Continental Shelf were paramount to the

rights of the states." Although the states sought rights only over
resources out to the three mile limit, the Court's decree in the last
Tidelands Case, United States v. Texas, defined the United States
paramount rights and powers over "lands, minerals and other
things" as extending from the inland waters to the outer edge of
the Continental Shelf. 5 The Court recognized that future disputes
might concern some other substance or the bed of the ocean itself
and concluded that when any property lay seaward of the low
water mark "its use, disposition, management, and control
involve[d] national interests and national responsibilities."4 A
recent case handed down after enactment of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, United States v.Maine, reaffirmed the Tidelands
Cases, stating that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act merely
proceeded from the premises established in the earlier Tidelands
Cases: that "paramount rights to the offshore seabed inhere in the
Federal Government as an incident of national sovereignty."4 7 An
international assignment of jurisdiction over the Continental
Shelf, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, signed by
43. S. Rep. No. 411, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1953). The Senate Report makes
it clear that the purpose of this added control is to claim resources on the Shelf.
Because the House version of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act became law,

however, references to the Senate Report may be unconvincing.
44. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) (dispute between United
States and Texas over rights to natural resources under Gulf of Mexico beyond

low water mark on coast of Texas and outside inland waters); United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) (dispute between United States and Louisiana
over rights to natural resources in area under Gulf of Mexico beyond low water
mark on coast of Louisiana and outside inland waters); United States v. California, 322 U.S. 19 (1947), rev'd per curiam, 322 U.S. 804 (1947) (dispute between
United States and California over rights to natural resources in submerged land
off of California coast between low water mark and three mile limit).
45. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
46. Id. at 719.
47. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) (United States opposed by

thirteen Atlantic Coast states in its claim of paramount power over the seabed

and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean more than three miles seaward of the
low water mark and the outer limits of inland coastal waters, extending to the

outer edge of the Continental Shelf). Comment, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 1009 (1975).
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the United States, granted exclusive jurisdiction to coastal nations

"over the continental shelf48 . . . for the purpose of exploring it and

exploiting its natural resources." 9 Constituting strong but not
binding authority, the International Law Commission's comments
to the Convention stated that "it is clearly understood that the
rights in question do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and
their cargoes . . . lying on the seabed or covered by sand of the

subsoil,"' 0 but apply only for the purpose of exploiting resources.
To the extent that a self-executing treaty like this one conflicts
with a prior act of Congress, such as the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, the treaty provisions control.5 '
The court began its analysis in the instant case by accepting
precedent holding that, in the absence of specific legislative manifestations of intent to invoke sovereign prerogative, the salvager

retains ownership of abandoned property. The United States does
not possess sovereign rights over abandoned property found by its
citizens, according to the court, since the Abandoned Properties
and Antiquities Acts do not constitute such specific manifestations. Expressing fear of possible international controversy, the
court pointed to language in the declaration of policy of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act explicitly preserving the international character of the water above the Shelf and limiting its application to resources in and under the Continental Shelf. Since,
accordingly, the federal government had no jurisdiction over the
Outer Continental Shelf beyond the natural resources, the court
held that the Abandoned Properties Act, which applies to lands
owned or controlled by the United States Government, and the
Antiquities Act,52 which covers property within United States ju48. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defines Continental Shelf as the "seabed and subsoil of the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the supeijacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. . .

."

Convention on the

Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578
(Effective June 10, 1964). Under this definition the seaward boundary of the
Continental Shelf depends, to some extent, on the technology of resource extraction. For a geographical definition of the Continental Shelf see note 4 supra.
49. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (effective June 10, 1964).
50. Report by the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly,
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 104, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).

51. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264
(1897).
52.

Although the criminal provisions of the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 433
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risdiction, cannot assert sovereign prerogative over ships wrecked
on the surface of the Outer Continental Shelf. Furthermore, the
court rejected enactment of sovereign prerogative under the Abandoned Properties Act by accepting the pre-amendment 3 limitation
of the Act's language, "ought to come to the United States," to
Civil War debris. The court then posited that the jurisdictional
provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which it had
held was limited to natural resource rights in and under the Outer
Continental Shelf, did not apply the regulatory provisions of the
Antiquities and Abandoned Properties Acts to the Outer Continental Shelf, since these acts depend on United States jurisdiction,
ownership and control over the land or property. Even if the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act granted jurisdiction over objects on
the seabed, the court continued, the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf, signed after the passage of the Act, superseded
this grant and restricted sovereign rights over the Continental
Shelf to exploitation of natural resources. Here the court relied

heavily on the International Law Commission's comments to the
Convention specifically excluding ships wrecked on the surface of
the Continental Shelf seabed from sovereign rights. 4 The court
thus held that sovereign prerogative has not been adopted or enacted into United States law and that the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act does not apply this doctrine or the Abandoned Properties and Antiquities Acts to the plaintiff. Regardless, such an application, according to the court, is barred by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The effects of the instant opinion center on the respective roles
of private and public control over antiquities on the surface of the
Outer Continental Shelf. The public certainly possesses a legitimate interest in antiquities on the Outer Shelf, particularly those
connected with its national heritage. Promotion of general public
knowledge and interest in its heritage should be a major goal of
such archaeological research.5 Public agencies may be able to
were not directly at issue in the instant case, the court mentions that in United
States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974), these provisions were held void for

vagueness. In Diaz, a prosecution for appropriating a new American Indian ceremonial mask from a cave, the Ninth Circuit found the term "antiquities" too
vague when applied to objects regardless of their age.

53. Russell v. Forty Bales of Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 42 (No. 12,154) (S.D. Fla.
1872).
54. Note 50 supra.
55.

Justifications given for past governmental restrictions of scientific re-

search in waters under national jurisdiction-that such research may give private
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broaden public knowledge by increasing tourism through display
of these antiquities, and by fostering cultural exchange through
use of the artifacts in barter. 6 Yet instances of private waste and
exploitation of artifacts have raised fears that private enterprise is
antipathetic to these goals. 5 On the other hand, the government
by itself may not be willing or able to allocate the resources necessary for exploration for objects of solely historical value, while
prospects for profit may supply impetus for such allocation by
private parties. Although there have been instances of private destruction, most private archaeological concerns use great care in
handling antiquities and allow occasional public access to them. 5
Strict governmental controls over such private parties may make
traffic in illicitly recovered artifacts profitable for less conscientious salvagers. For instance, a strict Florida statute governing
antiquities within its jurisdiction drove souvenir hunters underground and created a black market in artifacts,59 thereby reducing
public access. Therefore, in order to stimulate archaeological research on the Outer Continental Shelf and provide public access
to antiquities recovered, public control must preserve private
profit and altruistic motives by allowing private operators a substantial share of the artifacts they recover. The licensing scheme
in the Antiquities Act may permit this accomodation through contracts or lease arrangements with private salvagers similar to those
negotiated by states concerning inland and territorial waters.
Under the Antiquities Act the Departments of Interior, Agriculture
or the Navy could determine particular contract provisions as prerequisites to issuing permits. However, even if a higher court finds
enactment of sovereign prerogative and construes the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act broadly to include abandoned vessels and,

therefore, to permit such contracts under the Antiquities Act, the
instant court's interpretation of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf to preclude such an exercise of jurisdiction over the Shelf
appears inescapable. Consequently, such a government scheme
parties special advantages in exploitation of resources and that unregulated research may compromise national security and damage the environment-may
also be voiced against private freedom to salvage from the surface of the Outer
Continental Shelf. See Shore, MarineArchaeology and InternationalLaw: Background and Some Suggestions, 9 SAN DIEGo L. Rsv. 668, 673 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Shore].
56. See Shore, at 693.

57. Id.
58.

Shore, at 690.

59. Barada, CEDAM International,3 OcEANs No. 4, at 9, 17.
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would at most be effective on the Outer Continental Shelf against
United States citizens. Then resourceful salvagers could simply
avoid United States jurisdiction by avoiding United States citizenship. Therefore, while the government's arguments present a practicable vehicle for the accomodation of public and private interests, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf fatally limits its application. Through its interpretation of the Geneva Convention, the court in the instant case reasonably rejects the government's attempt to provide substantial protection of the public
interest in antiquities on the Outer Continental Shelf, reserving
such protection to specific congressional legislation. To assert substantial government control over antiquities on the Outer- Continental Shelf, federal legislation must specifically repudiate the
Convention provisions prohibiting this exercise of jurisdiction."0
While Congress may be reluctant to weaken the Geneva accord,
the realization that other nations have expanded their jurisdictions despite it,6 and that such legislation would not strike at the
heart of the Convention, may overcome this reluctance. Alternatively, the United States could alter its jurisdiction by agreement
in another Law of the Sea Conference; that, however, appears unlikely in view of the current stalemate in Conference negotiations.
James A. DeLanis
60.

Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46 (1895); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons

of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491 (1883).
61. Many countries, including parties to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, have extended their territorial waters, fishery zones, and national
jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed by the Convention. Anand, Limits of Na-

tional Jurisdictionin the Sea-Bed, 29 INDIA QUARTERLY 79, 96 (1973).

